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RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS
Jordan J. Paustt
3. Is PRESIDENT OBAMA'S USE OF PREDATOR STRIKES IN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS?
Editor's Note
In September 2010, the National Security Forum at William
Mitchell College of Law held its third annual National Security
Retreat. Among the participants were Eric Schmitt (New York
Times), Mary Ellen O'Connell (Notre Dame), and Hina Shamsi
(NYU/UN). The participants debated several questions posed by
Professor A. John Radsan. Professor Paust provided his written
answers to those questions as a response to Question #3.
ARMED DRONES: RESPONDING TO PROFESSOR RADSAN'S QUESTIONS
Professor John Radsan raised some interesting questions for
discussion during the National Security Retreat at William Mitchell
College of Law last September. This essay provides brief responses
to the questions. Professor Radsan's first question asked what is the
best legal foundation for an American targeted-killing program-
self-defense, armed conflict, a hybrid model? In my opinion, the
best legal foundation either outside the context of war or during
war is Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and what I term the
self-defense paradigm. During armed conflict, a hybrid approach is
also appropriate, using self-defense under the Charter as well as
relevant laws of war. Professor Radsan's second question was
whether it is legal for any U.S. agency to use armed UAVs in
Pakistan without the Pakistani government's public approval. I do
not agree that any U.S. agency can or should use UAVs, but I agree
that the President, as commander in chief, DOD, U.S. military
personnel, and CIA operatives could lawfully use armed UAVs in
f Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.
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Pakistan without Pakistani consent.
My recent article on self-defense targetings of non-State actors
and permissibility of use of drones in Pakistan' demonstrates that
using measures of self-defense against armed attacks by non-state
actors is permissible under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter and relevant customary international law, even though the
direct effects of responsive force against the non-state actors will
most often occur in a foreign country. The article also argues that
nothing in Article 51 of the Charter or in general patterns of pre-
and post-Charter state practice and opinio juris requires special
express consent of the state from which non-state actor armed
attacks emanate and on whose territory a self-defense action takes
place against the non-state actor. Additionally, it would be
demonstrably incorrect to claim that a state has no right to defend
itself outside its own territory absent (1) express foreign state
consent, (2) attribution or imputation of non-state actor attacks to
the foreign state when the foreign state is in control of non-state
actor attacks, or (3) the existence of a relevant international or
non-international armed conflict.4
My article also notes that the self-defense paradigm is different
from both a mere law-of-war or law-enforcement paradigm, and
self-defense targetings and captures can occur with respect to those
who are direct participants in armed attacks (DPAA) whether or
not an armed conflict exists that would also allow the targeting and
capture of persons who are combatants, civilians who are direct
participants in hostilities (DPH) , or civilians who are unprivileged
fighters engaged in a continuous combat function.
With respect to the war in Afghanistan and the targeting and
capture of leaders and other members of al Qaeda and the Taliban
in parts of Pakistan, few would disagree with the recognition that
the de facto theater of war has expanded to include parts of
Pakistan.9 As noted in my article, there is a porous border between
1. Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of
U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717.
2. Id. at 238-49, 279-80.
3. Id. at 249-58, 279.
4. Id. at 249-58, 279-80.
5. Id. at 258-69.
6. Id. at 271-73.
7. Id. at 275.
8. Id. at 279-80.
9. Id. at 254-55; see Ved P. Nanda, International Law Implications of the United
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Afghanistan and Pakistan that neither country effectively controls.'o
For several years, quite deadly, injurious, and continuous "al Qaeda
and Taliban armed attacks [have been] planned, initiated,
coordinated, or directed from inside Afghanistan and Pakistan on
U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan who are engaged in an
international armed conflict" and the theater of war has expanded
to locations where persons directly participate in hostilities. Lawful
measures of self-defense can occur outside of an actual theater of
war against those who are directly participating in an ongoing
process of armed attacks against the United States and its
embassies, military personnel, and other nationals abroad. The
right of self-defense allows the targeting of persons wherever such
forms of direct participation occur. Yemen is an example, since it
is clear that significant armed attacks or attempted armed attacks
have emanated from parts of Yemen." My article also demonstrates
why human rights law does not protect targeted persons who are
not within the jurisdiction or effective control of a country engaged
in self-defense or law-of-war targetings.12
Professor Radsan's third question was whether it is legal for the
CIA to be involved in targeted killing and whether such is wise. Of
course, the CIA should be involved in providing needed
intelligence with respect to possible targets, their location, whether
civilians who are not taking a direct part in armed attacks or
hostilities are nearby, and whether other options are available, such
as capture in self-defense or during armed conflict.
Another issue, however, is whether CIA personnel should be
flying armed drones and effectuating targetings in self-defense or
during armed conflict. With respect to armed conflicts, one
problem is that under the laws of war, combatant status and
combatant immunity for lawful acts of war are available for
members of the regular armed forces of a party to an international
States' "War on Terror, " 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 513, 533 (2009) ("One could
justify the targeted strikes by the US in Pakistan on the ground that the
geographical region of conflict stretches from Afghanistan to Pakistan. . . . It is
recommended that the Obama administration review its policy authorizing the
killing of suspected terrorists outside the geographical region of armed conflict...
. [I]f killings are sought outside the area of hostilities the 'proportionality'
element [should] be strictly adhered to, and . .. if terrorists can be apprehended
killings should be a last resort.").
10. Paust, supra note 1, at 254-55.
11. See, e.g., Peter Finn & Gregg Miller, Package Bombs More Lethal than in
December 25 Attempt, WASH. PosT, Nov. 2, 2010, at A03.
12. Paust, supra note 1, at 264-65.
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armed conflict, but are not available for CIA personnel who are not
members of the regular armed forces. This can result in possible
criminal liability under relevant domestic law for murder, assault
and battery, and other crimes.14 It would be better for U.S. military
personnel to fly the drones during an armed conflict, but an
argument can be made that under general patterns of state practice
and opinio juris it is evident that the international community
tolerates killings by non-military persons who are otherwise lawfully
carrying out responsive uses of force in self-defense under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter and, therefore, that they have an
implied immunity for such targetings.' 5  Another problem,
however, is whether CIA lawyers are numerous enough and
sufficiently well trained in relevant international law to provide
rigorous, competent, and immediate legal advice to CIA target
selectors and drone operators. JAG officers in the military services
are more clearly able to provide such advice and in recent history
JAG officers and other military personnel appear to have been
more accountable for their violations of international law.'6
Accountability and an end to impunity are important in a
democracy committed to the rule of law, and the lack of
accountability for serial war crimes can pose threats to our national
security."
The fourth question asked how civilian casualties can tilt the
targeted-killing program into illegality. This can occur if under the
overall self-defense and/or law-of-war targeting program there are
violations of the principles of distinction among civilians,
reasonable necessity, and proportionality that are applicable under
the self-defense paradigm or the law-of-war paradigm. 8  Under
13. Id. at 277-78; Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice,
Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA Targeted Killing (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at
7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 625829.
14. Paust, supra note 1, at 277-78.
15. See id. at 278-80.
16. See Jordan J. Paust, Ending the U.S. Program of Torture and Impunity:
President Obama's First Steps and the Path Forward, 19 TUL.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 151,
151-54, 161 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569764; Jordan J.
Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43
VAL. U. L. REv. 1535, 1546 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331159.
Cf Radsan & Murphy, supra note 13, at 20-23, 28, 32, 36 (noting a six-step U.S.
military decisional and review process and suggesting criteria and concerns with
respect to lawful CIA roles and decision-making).
17. See Jordan J. Paust, Serial War Crimes in Response to Terrorism Can Pose
Threats to National Security, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5201, 5201-04 (2009).
18. See Paust, supra note 1, at 270-72, 274-77; Radsan & Murphy, supra note
2011] 5131
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international law, there must not be indiscriminate use of force'9
and there must not be unnecessary death, injury, or suffering.so
One must also generally distinguish between ordinary civilians who
are not targetable and those who are targetable because they are
DPAA or DPH, or because they are engaged in a continuous
combat function during an armed conflict. If these principles are
being followed generally but there are errant violations in
particular instances, the overall program would not be tainted with
the illegality that attaches to particular targetings that are unlawful.
Application of the general principles must be made in connection
with actual features of context and by taking into account the value
of the target; timing; proximity to and the number of other persons
who are not targetable; the precision in targeting that can be
obtained; fore-seeable consequences with respect to civilian death,
injury, and suffering; and so forth.
The final question asked what the Obama administration
should do to improve the program. Two adjustments would
improve the legal underpinnings of the program. First, it would be
more advisable to use members of the regular armed forces for
final target selection and targetings by drone, with real-time advice
from JAG officers. Second, there should be constant assurance at
all levels that relevant international legal principles guide
decisions-as Harold Koh, legal adviser to the Secretary of State,
has averred:
Our procedures and practices for identifying lawful
targets are extremely robust, and advanced technologies
have helped to make our targeting even more precise. In
my experience, the principles of distinction and pro-
portionality ... are implemented rigorously throughout
the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure
that such operations are conducted in accordance with all
applicable law.
13, at 7.
19. Paust, supra note 1, at 270.
20. Id. at 270 n.87.
21. Id. at 272 n.90; see also id. at 275-77.
22. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote address
at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, The Obama
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